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NONMILITARY STRATEGIES AND COMPETITION FOR POWER: 
THE NEED FOR EXPANDED REGULATION OF COERCION 
By Walter L. Williams, Jr.* 
The general focus of this brief paper is on the use of coercive strategies 
in the global power process in which states as the principal participants 
(but also, other groups) strive to maximize power positions-the control 
over persons, territory, resources, and institutions (political, economic, 
etc.). Interaction in the use of coercive strategies is in tum a process-
the coercion process, in which participants for varying objectives use 
diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military strategies coercively with 
deprivational impact ranging from quite low levels (e.g., a mild diplo-
matic reproach) to extremely high levels (e.g., major destruction oflife 
and property in full scale armed combat).1 
The more specific focus here is on the use of nonmilitary strategies in 
this competition for power. As our world community becomes ever more 
interdependent as to all values, nonmilitary strategies, which may be 
referred to generally as diplomatic (communications to government 
officials), ideological (communications addressed to the mass audience 
comprising the populace of the target state(s)), and economic (restrictions 
on access to raw materials, goods, services, markets, finances, etc.), can 
have increasingly coercive impact. Diplomatic communications convey-
*Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School ofLaw, College ofWilliam & Mary. 
1 This process of coercion is described in detail in M. S. McDoUGAL & F. FEUCIANO, 
LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, Ch. 1 (1961). 
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ing threats of imminent and substantial military or economic coercion, 
or propaganda attacks designed to erode popular support of specific 
governmental policy or to incite revolt, obviously may have major impact 
upon the target state and achieve the power objectives of the initiator of 
the coercion more promptly and at far less cost than application of armed 
force. Global telecommunications technology dramatically increases the 
ability to bring these strategies to bear. However, the susceptibility today 
of many states to economic coercion perhaps deserves principal attention. 
The Arab oil embargo after the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973, 
dramatized the ability of a state, or a group in combination, controlling 
the major portion of a crucial natural resource to cause substantial damage 
to national economies. Similarly, one or more states may refuse access to 
much needed financial institutions, to scientific or technical knowledge, 
etc., all with quite coercive effects, or they may boycott supplier states, 
i.e., close access to principal markets for sale of raw materials or finished 
products. Other effects could be substantial damage' to well-being (lower 
standard ofliving, hunger, even famine), to the basic power positions of 
target states, and to other values. Paust and Blaustein, in their article, 
"The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to International Peace,"2 dramatically 
describe possible immediate outcomes and longer-range effects of such 
-coercion. In short, today, economic strategies could have adverse conse-
quences far more extensive than the bombing of a city or other military 
actions that would call into play international decisionmaking processes 
and prescriptions designed to regulate and limit such armed coercion. 
Perhaps, the crucial issue for this seminar is the question: Does inter-
national law regulate at all the use of economic strategies, and other non-
military strategies, having substantial coercive impact? Until this century, 
states used all strategies, military and otherwise, to whatever levels of 
coercion desired, without regard to whether they were authorized by law. 
The long, arduous process of development of community policy seeking 
maximum emphasis on use of persuasive rather than coercive strategies, 
and particularly to render significant use of armed force impermissible 
except for community approved objectives, finally culminated-only in 
the lifetime of many living today-in the first crude prescriptions oflaw 
regulating the use of armed force and the establishment of still highly 
imperfect community processes of decision to pass on the permissibility 
of particular applications of armed force. That principal attention has 
been focused on the application of armed force probably has been, and 
still is, warranted. Surely, the most crucial need for any community is to 
establish and maintain legal regulation of armed force. Further, until 
recent times, the relatively uncomplex economic structures of states, and 
their lesser degree of interdependence, rendered states less susceptible 
to prompt and intense coercion from economic strategies, or other 
strategies. For example, modern means of mass communication have 
become available just at the time that so many national societies have 
become especially susceptible to ideological coercion due to hostile per-
2 68 AJIL 410 (1974). 
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spectives based on race, religion, culture, political and economic beliefs, 
disparity in economic development, etc. 
As to the question whether the trend of legal decision has kept pace 
with economic coercion, I am dubious. One can find a plenitude of 
formally announced community policy that decisionmakers could apply 
to determine the permissibility of particular acts of economic coercion. 
There is the general policy of maintaining minimum world public order, 
of limiting to the fullest extent possible the substantial deprivation of 
values and regulating coercion to serve only community approved objec-
tives. One could apply various policy provisions in the UN Charter (the 
Preamble, Arts. 1 and 2, etc.) and related documents, and regional accords 
(e.g., Art. 19 of the OAS Charter). In recent years, a series ofUN resolu-
tions have condemned economic coercion. A few examples: the 1965 
General Assembly's Declaration on Non-Intervention, providing that no 
state "may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other 
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the 
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it 
advantages of any kind."; the General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on 
Friendly Relations, which repeats this statement; and the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 3281 in 1974. These and many other resolutions are cited and 
discussed at length in Paust and Blaustein. 
That these manifold expressions of community policy provide an ade-
quate base to authorize regulation of economic coercion is indisputable 
(Parenthetically, many of these provisions likewise could be applied to 
coercive use of diplomatic and ideological strategies.) Some writers find 
that international law does indeed presently regulate economic coercion.3 
Others are either strongly suggestive or quite positive that present 
international law does not regulate economic coercion.4 I suggest, 
reluctantly, that the latter view appears more accurately to gauge the past 
trend of decision. (I am not referring to the case whether economic 
coercion in general or in particular detail is regulated by specific agree-
ment between certain states.) I suggest that although community policy 
favoring regulation of economic coercion exists, the will of decision-
makers to apply that policy and to commit resources to insure adherence 
to that policy does not, to date. I suggest that we are observing a process 
of policy development, not application. For prescribed standards of 
conduct to be law, they must be both authoritative and controlling. I do 
not see control applied; I do not see in the past conduct of states adher-
ence to prescriptions regulating economic coercion; I do not see govern-
mental expectations that other governments will limit economic coercion 
to instances authorized by community policy, or else, be effectively 
3 See Paust & Blaustein, supra note 2. 
4 See I. Shibata. Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality under International 
Law, 68 AJIL 591 (1974); J Boorman, Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab 
Oil Weapon and the Ensuing juridical Issues, 9 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 205 (1974); J. Muir, 
The Boycott in International Law, id. 187. 
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sanctioned for departure from prescription. I note that Messrs. Paust and 
Blaustein in discussing expressions of community policy cite little if any 
evidence of past general adherence to that policy, or even of govern-
mental claim of violation of international law by acts of economic 
coercion, in settings of specific disputes. Even in the case of the Arab oil 
embargo, with its substantial adverse impact on many states, I have found 
no governmental claims that such conduct was impermissible under 
international law. The United States was a principal target of the 
embargo. Yet, in November 1973, and January 1974, Secretary Kissinger 
expressed "full understanding" for the Arab action and could "unqer-
stand reasons" for the embargo. Even as late as March 1974, with the 
embargo continuing after all the U.S. peace efforts, he resorted only to 
tougher diplomatic language, without reference to legal claim, that the 
embargo "could affect the attitude with which we will have to pursue 
our diplomacy." I know of no governmental communications at that time; 
no governmental actio~s initiated in any informal or formal arena that 
claimed, much less resulted in a decision, that economic coercion in 
general, or the Arab oil embargo in particular, was subject to regulation 
under international law. Where is meaningful state conduct? Writers such 
as Muir, Boorman, and Shihata,5 describe a multitude of instances of past 
resort to substantial economic coercion by states without regard to the 
question of community authorization. In other sessions at this Annual 
Meeting, we have heard various lawyers in our government speak of the 
extensive use of economic coercion by or against the United States, 
without even raising the question of permissibility of such coercion under 
international law. There is indeed a "loud silence" on this issue. I submit 
that in the face of contrary formal expressions of community policy, state 
conduct implicitly, but overwhelmingly, demonstrates that the past trend 
of decision has been that states may engage in economic (and other 
nonmilitary) coercion and counter-coercion without regulation under 
general international law. 
Whether a trend is presently developing toward legal regulation is also 
uncertain. Policy cries out for it as our economic interdependence rapidly 
increases and the world community has been sensitized to the problem by 
the Arab oil embargo. However, we are in what seems to be a retrograde 
period as concerns commitment to common interests. Substantial addi-
tional damage may have to occur from such unregulated coercion before 
we have policy effectively applied as controlling prescription. 
Finally, what might we do to promote accelerated achievement of 
community policies seeking legal regulation of coercive nonmilitary 
strategies? Fundamental to this problem is the continuing lack of 
favorable perspectives of governmental officials. We could work to alter 
these perspectives by educating officials as to: (a) the increasing global 
interdependence in all values and the risks thereto entailed in using 
such strategies; (b) the questionable efficacy in achieving desired objec-
tives through using such strategies, while resulting perhaps in much more 
5 Supra note 4. 
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damage than anticipated to all participants through escalating coercion 
and counter-coercion; and (c) the positive outcomes anticipated from 
subjecting coercive nonmilitary strategies to regulation under inter-
national law. Concurrently, we could also be working on recommenda-
tions of more specific prescriptions of policy concerning the use of 
coercive nonmilitary strategies and of guidelines for decisionmakers in 
the process of applying those prescriptions in specific cases. As to the 
criteria to apply, we might study the utility of using much the same 
criteria as are used in assessing the permissibility of military strategies 
(e.g., first initiator of coercion, objectives of the coercion, intensity and 
proportionality of deprivational impact, opportunity for use of persuasive 
strategies of dispute settlement, opportunity for prior resort to com-
munity agencies competent to pass on permissibility of the exercise of 
the coercion, etc.).6 I have disagreed with the above-cited article by 
Paust and Blaustein to the extent that those writers appear, in this case, 
too ready to presume general adherence to policy merely because formal 
expressions of policy exist. Nevertheless, their comprehensive, 
contextual, policy-oriented approach illustrates how we might seek to 
accomplish the tasks I have outlined here. 
8 See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, especially Ch. 3, for suggestive discussion. 
